A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is an integration of sensor networks with informational devices. CPS can be used for many promising applications, such as traffic observation, battlefield surveillance, and sensor-network-based monitoring. One key issue in CPS research is trustworthiness analysis of sensor data. Due to technology limitations and environmental influences, the sensor data collected by CPS are inherently noisy and may trigger many false alarms. It is highly desirable to sift meaningful information from a large volume of noisy data. In this study, we propose a method called Tru-Alarm, which increases the capability of a CPS to recognize trustworthy alarms. Tru-Alarm estimates the locations of objects causing alarms, constructs an object-alarm graph and carries out trustworthiness inference based on the graph links. The study also reveals that the alarm trustworthiness and sensor reliability could be mutually enhanced. The property is used to help prune the large search space of object-alarm graph, filter out the alarms generated by unreliable sensors and improve the algorithm's efficiency. Extensive experiments are conducted on both real and synthetic datasets, and the results show that Tru-Alarm filters out noise and false information efficiently and effectively, while ensuring that no meaningful alarms are missed.
Introduction
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) integrates physical devices (e.g., sensors, cameras) with cyber (or informational) components to form a scenario-integrated analytical system that may respond intelligently to the dynamic changes of the real-world situations. It is typically deployed as a sensor network of interacting elements with a huge amount of data [23] . The system links the sensor data to various information applications for real-time analysis. CPSs are widely applied to highway traffic monitoring [6, 24] , weather forecasting [2], healthcare systems [33] and battlefield surveillance [5] . CPS research is a top priority in the federal research investment list of U.S. President's council of advisors on science and technology [28] .
A recent article reports that U.S. forces are using such systems in Iraq to protect troops and bring security to towns [1] . The so-called battle-network systems constantly watch designated areas day and night, detect approaching enemies and send alarms to the command center. However, the deployed sensors are easily damaged in harsh environments. Some irrelevant activities, such as windblown debris or animal movements, also influence the sensors and may cause false alarms [27] . It is very challenging to distinguish the meaningful information and trustworthy alarms with large volume of noisy data.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows the deployment of battle-network system. The CPS has 28 sensors around a troop station. When an object is approaching, the neighboring sensors will detect its movements and generate data records based on the received signal strength. Suppose the alarm threshold of the records is set to 10. If a sensor's reading is larger than the threshold, an alarm will be generated. The sensors with alarms are tagged with red color (i.e., solid circle) and those with normal readings are in blue color (i.e., shaded circle). An enemy soldier enters the monitored region and he is detected by surrounding sensors s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , s 7 and s 8 . Sensor s 7 's reading is the highest since it is the closest one to the soldier. The five surrounding sensors send alarms to the command center. However, a mouse passes in front of sensor s 15 , and its activity causes a high reading of the sensor and generates a false alarm. Such alarm should be filtered out by the system. A reliable CPS must reach a high trust level. The data trustworthiness issue is listed as a major challenge for CPS applications, partly due to the following difficulties [23] :
• Huge Size: A typical CPS includes hundreds of sensors and each sensor generates data in every few minutes. The management system is required to process the huge dataset and evaluate the alarms with high efficiency.
• Noisy Data: Many deployment experiences have shown that the unreliable and noisy data are major issues for CPS applications. Buonadonna et al. list the difficulties of obtaining accurate CPS data [4] . The failures can occur in various unexpected ways and less than 49% of their data could be used for meaningful interpretation [35] . In another deployment at Great Duck Island [30] , Szewczyk et al. found out that about 60% data were faulty.
• Non-Availability of Training Sets: Many traditional false alarm detection methods are supervised, i.e., their classifiers are built based on training datasets [26, 21, 12] . Such aids are hard to get in CPS since it is costly and error-prone to manually label the large dataset generated by sensors.
• Conflicts of Sensors: A well deployed CPS system has reasonable redundancies, e.g., a standard called k-coverage requires that each region is monitored by at least k different sensors [39] . Sometimes a sensor does not work correctly, but the others can still provide accurate information. In such cases, the conflicts occur among reliable and faulty sensors. Since the user does not know which sensor is trustworthy in advance, the system needs to infer the truth from conflicting data.
• Uncertainty of Objects: The alarms in CPS are caused by abnormal behaviors in the monitored region, e.g., enemy intrusion in a battle-network system. Due to hardware limitations, the sensors cannot provide detailed information about intrusion objects. Most of them can only estimate a possible region of the objects. The system has to integrate data from multiple sensors to estimate the object's detailed information. The problem of sensor fault detection have been studied in the fields of sensor network and process control [16, 19, 25] . However, CPS differs from traditional sensor networks in a few ways that make the problem more difficult. The first issue is that CPS usually involves more sensors and the monitoring area is much larger. The sensors connecting via wireless networks generate much more faulty records. In addition, the inputs of many traditional networks are well-defined and controlled. In CPS applications, the sensors are used to observe the natural phenomena or human behaviors of the physical world. The monitored objects are often not well-defined, resulting in higher uncertainty when modeling sensor behaviors and data faults.
The communities of data engineering and data mining have also studied this problem in recent years. Many methods are proposed to detect false alarms based on the neighborhood similarity hypothesis [15, 26, 18] . This hypothesis assumes that a sensor's reading should be similar to its k-Nearest Neighbors (kNNs). False negatives (missing real alarms) may be caused by this hypothesis since some reliable sensors also cannot detect the activity if they are distant from the object. In Example 1, sensor s 5 's four nearest neighbors are s 3 , s 2 , s 1 and s 4 , but only s 4 's reading is close to s 5 , the other three's readings are much lower than s 5 . According to the neighborhood similarity hypothesis, s 5 's alarm will be dismissed.
In this study, we propose a novel approach, Tru-Alarm, to infer meaningful and trustworthy alarms. It is un-supervised yet effective. Different from traditional sensor oriented approaches, Tru-Alarm takes the objects that cause alarm into consideration. The system builds up an object-alarm graph to model the relationship between alarms and intrusion objects. The trustworthiness analysis is then carried out on this graph. This paper substantially extends the ICDM 2010 conference version [34] , in the following ways: (1) introducing the concept of sensor reliability to model the temporal infor-3 mation and device trustworthiness; (2) revealing the fact that the alarm trustworthiness could be mutually enhanced with sensor reliability; (3)proposing new trustworthiness analysis algorithms based on sensor reliability; (4) discussing new pruning techniques to increase the algorithm's efficiency; (5) carrying out the time complexity analysis of proposed algorithms; (6) providing complete formal proofs for properties and propositions; (7) covering related work in more details and including recent ones; (8) introducing the object localization techniques as the preliminary knowledge; and (9) expanding our performance studies on real datasets. The results show that the sensor reliability-based methods have higher efficiency and accuracy.
To sum up, the key contributions of this study are listed as follows.
• Introducing the concepts of trustworthiness scores to measure the sensor reliability and alarm confidence in CPS.
• Proposing a framework to find the trustworthy alarms. The system first estimates locations of intrusion objects by integrating alarm information from multiple sensors, then constructs the object-alarm graph to connect the alarms with related objects. The trustworthiness analysis tasks are explored along the links of such graph.
• Designing pruning techniques to enable efficient trustworthiness inference. The search space of an object-alarm graph is large. Two pruning techniques, namely the object pruning algorithm and sensor pruning algorithm, are designed to reduce the large size of object-alarm graph.
• Conducting extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of TruAlarm on both real and synthetic datasets. The results show that Tru-Alarm yields higher precision and recall than existing methods. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminary knowledge and defines the problem; Section 3 describes the framework and techniques of TruAlarm; Section 4 presents the method of sensor reliability-based inference; Section 5 conducts the performance evaluations on different datasets; Section 6 discusses the related studies and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Background and Preliminaries

Problem Definition
Cyber-physical systems are deployed in different scenarios with various types of sensors. For example, infrared sensors, ultrasonic sensors and acoustic sensors are frequently used for the purpose of detecting intrusion objects [5] . They have different sensing mechanisms and measurements. In this study, we use a general term, severity reading r(s, t), to represent the detected signal strength by sensor s at time t. For a single object o, if there is no obstacle between s and o, the equation of r(s, t) can be written as a formula of o's signal strength and the distance between o and s: r(s, t) = f (dist(s, o), Ω(o)). This formula has different formats according to the sensor types and detecting mechanisms. For example, the acoustic sensor's severity reading is [3] :
where α ∝ 1/dist(s, o) 2 represents the effect of signal attenuation, which is inversely quadric to the distance. Area(s) is the covering area of sensor s, when there is no object in that area, the sensor's severity is only the background noise b, which is close to zero in most cases.
Given severity threshold δ s , if a data record's severity r(s, t)> δ s , an alarm is generated and this record is tagged as an alarming record, denoted by r a (s, t). In CPS, the alarming record set R a is a subset of the entire dataset R. Definition 1. (Alarm Trustworthiness): Let r a (s, t) be an alarming record generated by sensor s at time t, the trustworthiness of r a (s, t) is the probability that it is correct, denoted by τ (r a (s, t) ).
The task of Tru-Alarm is to identify the trustworthy alarms from the sensor dataset, which can be formally described as follows.
. ., r(s m , t n ) } be a sensor dataset, and R a ⊆ R be the set of alarm records. Given trustworthiness threshold δ t , Tru-Alarm's task is to identify the trustworthy alarms with τ (r a (s, t)) > δ t .
Note that we mainly focus on the trustworthiness analysis for alarming records in this study, because the alarming records are usually much more important than normal ones in many application domains. In addition, the sensors that are affected by irrelevant activities or system errors also tend to generate abnormal records with high severity readings rather than normal records. Figure 2 lists the notations used throughout this paper. 
Notation
Object Localization
Due to hardware limitation, CPS sensors cannot provide accurate information about locations of the intrusion objects. The common acoustic sensors generate alarms when there is any object inside their detecting range. The object location is estimated as a possible region bounded by a circle (Figure 3 (a) ). Some special sensors can narrow down this region, e.g., the range sensors can estimate the approximate distance to the object (Figure 3 (b) ); the bearing sensors with ultrasonic or microwave devices can determine a rough direction of the object movements by sending out pulses and measuring the reflection (Figure 3 (c) ); the sensors combining both range and bearing functions can further narrow down the region to a part of sector (Figure 3 (d) ). As discussed in [5] , the range and bearing sensors still suffer from noise. They require more resources to deploy and cost much more energy by sending out pulses. In this study, we mainly develop our methods based on the common sensors. The proposed framework can be easily extended to any special types of sensors.
Common Sensor Range Sensor Bearing Sensor Combination Sensor Localizing objects by sensor network has been a hot research topic in the sensor network community for decades. Many state-of-the-art methods have been proposed in [3, 36, 17] . A common applied method is the sampling approach [17] . Suppose the possible regions of alarming sensors cover N points. With a sample ratio l, the sampling algorithm uniformly selects n = l × N points as the possible object locations. Example 2. Figure 4 shows the battle-network deployment of Example 1. The sensors with alarms are tagged with red color (i.e., solid circle) and those with normal readings are in blue color (i.e., shaded circle). There are six alarming sensors. The possible regions are bounded by circles of dashed lines. Suppose the sampling algorithm selects 10 possible objects that are uniformly distributed in those regions (i.e., solid triangles). In this way, some ghost objects are generated but they do not really exist. The work is left to Tru-Alarm to filter out those ghost objects and identify the real ones. Note that, a trustworthy object is the one that is meaningful to users. In Example 1, sensor s 15 actually detects a mouse as the object. However, it is not interesting for the user, since the objects in battle-network should be the approaching enemies.
The Framework of Trustworthiness Analysis
Object-Alarm Graph
The sensor's type and maximum detecting range can be learned before CPS deployment. If a sensor works well, it should detect any object movements inside the range. Formally, we define the monitored object set of a sensor as below. 6 One may notice that an alarm may be related to multiple objects, and an object usually has several related alarms. In this way, we build up a relational graph between the objects and the alarms. In this object-alarm graph, two kinds of nodes are presented: the objects and their monitoring sensor's data records. The monitoring-monitored relationship is modeled as an edge in the graph. Example 3. Figure 5 (a) shows the monitoring sensor set retrieved from Example 2. The red nodes (i.e., solid circles) are the alarming sensors, the blue nodes (i.e., shaded circles) represent normal sensors and the triangle nodes are the objects. For instance, object o 2 has three monitoring sensors: s 2 , s 3 and s 5 , in which s 5 reports an alarm r a (s 5 , t). r a (s 5 , t) is not only related to o 2 but it is also related to o 4 and o 5 . Because the three objects are all in s 5 's detecting range and any of them may cause this alarm. Figure 5 (b) shows the retrieved object-alarm graph.
Trustworthiness Inference
There are two kinds of edges in the graph: the normal edge linking the object with a normal record (the dashed lines in Figure 5 ), and the object-alarm edge (the black lines in Figure 5 ). The weight of each object-alarm edge represents how likely the alarm is caused by such object, i.e., the conditional alarm trustworthiness τ (r a (s i , t)|o). The first step of trustworthiness inference is to estimate the weight of every object-alarm edge. Example 4. We illustrate the intuition of trustworthiness inference by an example shown in Figure 6 . In Figure 6 (a), the alarms reported by s 1 , s 2 and s 3 are trustworthy, and the alarm by s 7 is false. In the object-alarm graph ( Figure 6(b To estimate the coherence score between two sensors' records, the system must take into account both their severity difference and positions. In Figure 6 , the values of r a (s 1 , t) and r(s 4 , t) have large severity difference, but they are actually coherent if counting their distances to o 1 as a factor. When computing coh(r a (s i , t), r(s j , t)), the system should consider whether s j would report the same severity if it was located at s i 's position.
As mentioned in Section 2, the formula of computing r(s, t) can be learned in advance. Then we can get the inverse function of object o's signal strength from the reading of sensor s j . For the acoustic sensor, which is one of the most common deployed sensor in CPS, the signal strength can be computed as:
Then the expected severity of sensor s j at s i 's location is computed as following. 
is judged by the difference of the expected severity and real reading of s j , as shown in Eq. (2). Its value range is [0, 1]. A standard deviation σ is computed for all the sensors in monitoring sensor set S o . If sensor s j 's severity is the same as the expected value, the coherence score reaches the maximum of 1; if the difference is larger than the standard deviation σ, i.e., s j 's severity is quite different from expected value, the coherence score is set to 0.
In the monitoring sensor set of a specific object, if other sensors' readings are coherent with an alarm record, the alarm's trustworthiness is high. Otherwise it is unlikely to be caused by the object. τ (r a (s i , t)|o) is computed as the average coherence scores of other sensors' readings in the monitoring sensor set S o , as shown in Eq. (3) .
A low τ (r a (s, t)|o) indicates two possibilities: (1) r a (s, t) is a false alarm, such as r a (s 7 , t) in Figure 6 ; or (2) r a (s, t) is a true alarm, but it is not caused by object o. In Figure 6 , r a (s 3 , t) is a true alarm, but τ (r a (s 3 , t)|o 2 ) is low since o 2 does not really exist. In either case, object o's trustworthiness should be decreased. Hence we compute τ (o) as the value of the sum of conditional trustworthiness divided by the size of monitoring set S o , as shown in Eq. (4).
The equation to compute alarm trustworthiness is a bit different. If an alarm has different conditional trustworthiness with different objects, the Tru-Alarm will take the maximum one as the result, as shown in Eq. (5). This is because an alarm can be trustworthy even if there is only one real object causing it. In Figure 6 , r a (s 3 , t) has higher trustworthiness when considering it being caused by object o 1 rather than o 2 or o 3 . Even though o 2 and o 3 are found out to be ghost objects, the alarm is still trustworthy since o 1 is a real object. Figure 7 shows the algorithm to compute trustworthy scores for the alarms and objects in a snapshot. The system first retrieves the object-alarm links and calculates their conditional trustworthiness (Lines 2 -3). After that the system retrieves each object and computes their trustworthiness by Eq.(4) (Lines 4 -6). The real objects with high trustworthiness are added to the result set (Line 7). Finally the system scans the objectalarm graph again and computes the trustworthiness scores for each alarm (Lines 8 -11).
Algorithm 1. Trustworthiness inference in a snapshot
Input: object-alarm graph G in snapshot t, trustworthiness threshold t . Output: real object set O t , trustworthy alarm set Ra t .
1.
initialize O t and Ra t ; 2.
for each object-alarm edge e in G, do 3. compute e's conditional trustworthiness score; 4.
for each object o in G, do 5.
retrieve the monitoring sensor set of o;
for each alarm r a (s, t) in G, do 9.
retrieve the monitored object sensor set of s; 10.
compute (r a (s, t)); // Eq. (5) 11.
if (r a (s, t)) > t then add r a (s, t) to Ra t ; 12.
return O t and Ra t ; Proposition 1. Let n 1 be the number of alarming sensors, n 2 be the number of sampled objects, n 3 be the number object-alarm links in G, m 1 be the average size of the monitoring sensor set for each object and m 2 be the average size of the monitored object set for each sensor. The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
Proof: There are three major loops of Algorithm 1. In the first loop (Lines 2 -3), the system computes the conditional alarm trustworthiness for each object-alarm link e, and has to scan the object's monitoring sensor set for each computation. The time cost of this step is O(n 3 · m 1 ). In the second loop, the system computes the object trustworthiness score, the time cost is O(n 2 · m 1 ). Finally the algorithm scans the monitored object set of each sensor and computes the alarm trustworthiness with time cost O(n 1 · m 2 ). Hence
Example 5. Figure 8 shows a running example of Algorithm 1. For ten objects, the algorithm computes the conditional alarm trustworthiness and lists them in the first column. The object trustworthiness is then computed as the average value in the second column. 
Trustworthiness Inference with Object Pruning
The time cost of trustworthiness inference is affected by the number of objects. The efficiency will be a problem if a large number of objects are generated by the sampling algorithm. On the other hand, most objects turn out to have low trustworthiness. In Example 3, there are 10 objects but only o 4 is real. Algorithm 1 wastes the majority time on ghost objects that do not really exist. The algorithm's efficiency can be improved significantly if we can prune such ghost objects in advance. 
Intuitively, the real objects are usually surrounded with many alarming sensors, such as object o 4 in Example 3. The ghost objects often have some normal reading sensors nearby, like o 9 and o 10 . 11
Based on Property 1, we develop the algorithm of Tru-Alarm with Object Pruning (TAOP), as shown in Figure 9 . Algorithm 2 computes τ (o) and prunes the ghost objects before carrying out trustworthiness inference (Lines 2 -5). The remaining steps are the same as Algorithm 1. In the worst case, the algorithm cannot prune any objects beforehand, and the time complexity is the same as Algorithm 1. However in our experiments more than 80% of the objects are pruned and the algorithm achieves an order of magnitude speed-up.
Example 6. Figure 10 provides a running example of TAOP algorithm. The original object-alarm graph is shown in Figure 10(a) . Before making the trustworthiness inference, the system first estimates the upper-bounds of each object's trustworthiness. Suppose δ t is set to 0.6, the ghost objects o 1 , o 2 , . . ., o 10 are pruned in advance because their upper-bounds are less than the threshold. Hence the trustworthiness inference is only carried out on the links with objects o 4 and o 5 . As shown in Figure 10(b) , the object-alarm links are reduced from 14 to 7, and the algorithm may only cost half of the original time according to Proposition 1. Although o 5 's upper-bound passes the threshold, it is actually a ghost object and will be removed by TAOP after the inference step.
Sensor Reliability-based Inference
In Section 3, we have introduced the trustworthiness inference techniques based on the object-alarm graph. Since such graphs are generated from each snapshot separately, 
Sensor Reliability Model
Since CPS data are collected from sensors, the data quality is intrinsicly related to the sensor's reliability. A reliable sensor is more likely to generate trustworthy data in a relatively long period. Meanwhile, if the sensor is incorrectly deployed or deployed with system deficiencies, it may continually send out false alarms. Formally, we define the sensor reliability as follows. The sensor reliability model can help trustworthiness inference by adding to the computation of τ (r a (s, t)|o). The formula of conditional alarm trustworthiness is modified as Eq.(6). The factor of sensor reliability is considered in two places: (1) Selftrustworthiness: if a sensor sends out an alarm, the alarm's trustworthiness is influenced by the sensor itself. The more reliable the sensor is, the more trustworthiness the alarm will be. (2) Support weight: When summing up the coherence scores from other sensors' readings, the sensor reliability serves as the weight for each record. The coherence scores from more reliable sensors have higher impacts. In this way, even if a false alarm gets some supports from other unreliable sensors, its trustworthiness is still low if the readings from reliable sensors are not coherent. (ra(si,t),r(sj ,t) )
Another advantage of sensor reliability is to help eliminate the influence of dead sensors. In Algorithms 1 and 2, the object trustworthiness τ (o) may be decreased by dead sensors. If an unreliable sensor does not send out alarms for a real object o, then τ (o) is reduced according to Eq.(4). With the model of sensor reliability, we modify the computation of τ (o) as shown in Eq.(7). The sum of τ (s) is used as the denominator instead of the size of monitoring sensor set. In such case, even if the dead sensor does not send out alarms, its influence on the object trustworthiness is limited since its reliability is low.
The sensor reliability τ (s) helps to improve trustworthiness inference. However, the key problem is how to estimate such value. Different from the alarm trustworthiness τ (r a ) and object trustworthiness τ (o) defined in each snapshot, the sensor reliability τ (s) is calculated from all the snapshots. Let T be the snapshot sequence of CPS data, τ (s) is computed as the average alarm trustworthiness of the whole sequence.
Since τ (s) is computed from τ (r a ) and it in turn influences τ (o) and τ (r a ), we design an iterative algorithm to compute them. It is called Tru-Alarm with Sensor Reliability (TASR). The detailed process is summarized in Figure 11 . Algorithm 3 first initializes the sensor reliability scores and generates the object-alarm graph for each snapshot of the CPS dataset (Lines 1 -4) . The algorithm calculates the trustworthiness scores of alarms and objects in each snapshot with the initial sensor reliability (Lines 6 -7); then the system updates each sensor's reliability by the results of alarm trustworthiness (Lines 8 -9). This process is repeated until reaching a stable state (Line 10). Finally, the system scan the object-alarm graphs and sensor set to select out the trustworthy alarms and sensors (Lines 11 -18) .
Note that, the values of the sensor reliability and alarm trustworthiness change in each iteration. Once all the value changes are less than a given threshold (e.g., 1% of the values in the previous iteration), the system then considers it reaching a stable state. Too prevent the dead loop, a maximum number is set as the upper-bound for iteration times (e.g., 100 iterations).
Proposition 2. Let n be the average number of object-alarm links in each graph G i , m be the average size of the monitoring sensor set of each object, w be the number of snapshots and p be the number of iterations. The time complexity of algorithm 3 is O(n · m · w · p).
Proof: In each snapshot t i , the algorithm generates an object-alarm graph G i and for each object-alarm graph G i , do 7.
compute (o) and (r a (s, t)); \\Eq. (7) and (5) Example 7. Figure 12 shows a running example of TASR algorithm. We illustrate the process with the same dataset used in previous examples. At the beginning, we assume all the sensors are trustable and initialize their reliabilities as 1. The algorithm generates the object-alarm graph and calculates τ (o) and τ (r a ). The sensor reliability is then updated with computed τ (r a ). In this example, since there is only one snapshot in the dataset, τ (s) equals to τ (r a (s, t) ). In the second iteration, the algorithm continues to compute object and alarm trustworthiness with updated τ (s). The trustworthiness scores of false alarms decrease and they in turn bring down the corresponding sensor reliabilities. This process stops when those trustworthiness values become stable.
Trustworthiness Inference with Sensor Pruning
In practical applications, there is a relation of mutual enhancement between the alarm trustworthiness and sensor reliability: The sensors reporting many trustworthy alarms are likely to continue providing trustworthy alarms; and the unreliable ones that generate many false alarms will also report more faulty alarms. Therefore it is unnecessary to check 
Hence τ (r a (s, t) ) < δ t . Note that in order to employ Property 2 for sensor pruning, the trustworthiness threshold δ t should be set larger than 0.5. Based on this property, we propose TruAlarm with Sensor Pruning algorithm (TASP), as listed in Figure 13 . TASP algorithm has the same framework as TASR algorithm; however, the algorithm compares τ (s) with 2δ t − 1 after updating each sensor's reliability (Line 10). If a sensor s is unqualified, the system will remove all its alarms from each snapshot (Lines 11 -12). In this way, the size of the object-alarm graph is reduced with fewer alarms and the time efficiency of the algorithm is improved. (s, t) ); \\Eq. (7) and (5) Example 8. Figure 14 shows a running example of TASP algorithm. The original object-alarm graph is given in Figure 14 (a). Suppose δ t is set as 0.65. After the second iteration, τ (s 15 ) is less than 2δ t − 1, and the system prunes its alarms from the objectalarm graph. The remaining parts are shown in Figure 14(b) . The object-alarm links are reduced from 14 to 12. Although the reduction in links within a single snapshot may not be as great as with the TAOP algorithm, the TASP algorithm can remove the object-alarm links of unreliable sensors in each snapshot. In addition, the TASP and TAOP pruning strategies do not conflict. They can be mutually combined to prune both the ghost objects and unreliable sensors.
Performance Evaluation
Experiment Setup
Datasets: We conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the proposed methods, using both real-world and synthetic datasets. The real dataset D 1 is the acoustic sensor data collected from the benthic cover in turbid areas of Rehoboth bay, Delaware. The time 17 period is 20-hours. Meanwhile, to test the performance of Tru-Alarm in large and noisy datasets, we also generate three synthetic datasets based on the military trajectories in the CBMANET project [22] , in which an infantry battalion of 64 vehicles moves from Fort Dix to Lakehurst during a mission lasting 3 hours. The data generator simulates monitoring fields along their routes with 625 to 2,500 deployed sensors, and each sensor reports a reading every 10 seconds. To simulate windblown debris and small animal activities, the data generator selects out a proportion of sensors in random distribution and adds noises to their readings in each snapshot. The dataset size increases from D 1 to D 4 , but the trustworthy alarm ratio decreases. In the largest dataset D 4 , 39,145 alarms are reported by 2,500 sensors, but 71% of them are false. Competitors: We evaluate both the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed methods, including the Original Tru-Alarm (OTA), Tru-Alarm with Object Pruning (TAOP), Tru-Alarm with Sensor Pruning (TASP) and the combined algorithm with both Object Pruning and Sensor Pruning (OPSP). Environments: The experiments are conducted on a PC with Intel 7500 Dual CPU 2.20G Hz and 3.00 GB RAM. The operating system is Windows 7 Enterprise. All the algorithms are implemented in Java on the Eclipse 3.3.1 platform with JDK 1.5.0. The datasets and parameter settings are listed in Figure 15 .
Evaluations of Algorithm's Efficiency
In the first experiment, we evaluate the time efficiency of different algorithms with default settings. The system processes OTA, TAOP, TASP and OPSP on the four datasets Figure  16 . Note that the y-axis is in logarithm scale. In all datasets, OPSP achieves the best time efficiency. The acceleration effect of object and sensor pruning is not obvious in dataset D 1 . Since D 1 's data size is small and the trustworthy alarm ratio is high, most sensors are reliable and hence cannot be pruned. But in dataset D 4 , the system can prune many unreliable sensors and ghost objects. OPSP is an order of magnitude faster than OTA.
We also test the algorithms' time costs with different sampling ratio. Dataset D 4 is used in this experiment. Figure 17 shows that OTA's running time increases significantly according to the sampling ratio. Since more objects are generated with a higher sampling ratio, OTA has to carry out the trustworthiness inference for each object. However, TAOP and OPSP's time costs increase sub-linearly to sampling ratio. Even with more objects generated, the object pruning algorithms can effectively filter out the ghost objects in advance and keep efficiency high. 
Experiments in Trustworthy Alarm Detection
To study the effectiveness of Tru-Alarm methods, we use two important measures for noise filtering and trustworthy alarm detection.
• Precision: The proportion of trustworthy alarms over all detected alarms. It represents the algorithm's selectivity in filtering out false alarms.
• Recall: The proportion of detected trustworthy alarms over all trustworthy alarms.
This criterion shows the algorithm's sensitivity in detecting meaningful information.
The two measurements are difficult to improve simultaneously. Generally, increasing recall to detect more real alarms will also cause more false alarms, i.e., lower precision. In many CPS applications, the cost of missing a trustworthy alarm is much higher than reporting false alarms. Hence the user's requirement for recall is usually higher than precision.
If the system reports every detected alarm without any selection, the system can achieve the maximum recall of 100%, but the precision is as low as the trustworthy alarm ratio of the dataset. This strategy of reporting all alarms (All) is implemented as the baseline. We compare the algorithms of Tru-Alarm with kNN based methods in [15] , where the parameter k is set to 4, 8 and 16. We evaluated the proposed methods with default settings. Figure 18 shows the precision and recall with different trustworthiness threshold δ t on dataset D 1 . Since the object pruning technique does not influence the precision and recall, i.e., the performance of TAOP is the same as OTA, OPSP is the same as TASP. Hence we omit OTA and TASP, and only report TAOP and OPSP in the results. In the experiment, 4-NN and 8-NN methods achieve the best precision, however they cannot guarantee 100% recall. The precision of TAOP and OPSP is close to kNN methods with only 1%-3% differences in precision, but they can also guarantee detections of all the trustworthy alarms.
Then, we conduct the experiments with the same parameters on datasets D 2 , D 3 and D 4 . The results are recorded in Figures 19, 20 and 21 . Generally speaking, TAOP and OPSP have better precision than kNN based methods with reasonable δ t (more than 0.6), and they can guarantee not missing any trustworthy alarms (i.e., 100% recall) in all the datasets.
Note that, the kNN methods have better precision in small dataset with high trustworthy alarm ratios. However, the precision degenerates in the noisy datasets, because 20 they judge an alarm's trustworthiness by comparing with its neighbor's readings. When the noise proportion is high, the sensor's neighbors may also report false alarms and kNN methods will generate false positives. However, TAOP and OPSP can always maintain a relatively high precision of 70% to 80% on all the datasets. As a conclusion, they are more suitable for application to large and noisy sensor data. In the experiment, kNN methods always miss about 1% to 5% trustworthy alarms, which are reported by the edge sensors with normal reading neighbors (such as s 5 in Figure 1 ). Tru-Alarm can easily find those alarms by considering the object locations.
Another problem is that the trustworthiness threshold δ t is hard to tune for kNN methods. A higher threshold helps achieve better precision but reduces the recall. Fortunately, Tru-Alarm's recall is robust to δ t . It keeps 100% even with a high threshold of 0.8. The users can safely tune δ t without worrying missing trustworthy alarms. 
Related Works
The trustworthiness analysis of cyber-physical systems is a relatively new research topic. However, the problem of detecting faulty sensor signals has been studied extensively in the past decades. The community of data management and data mining also propose several methods to find outliers or anomalies for sensor network applications. In Section 6.1, we introduce the recent studies of data quality and trustworthiness analysis issues of CPS. In Section 6.2, we make a brief survey of the noise filtering and faulty detection techniques in sensor networks, data streams and other similar scenarios.
Data Trustworthiness Studies in Cyber-Physical Systems
Sha et al. give a survey of the history of CPS development in [31] . The study of trustworthiness is listed as one of the three major challenges in the survey. They emphasize that CPS applications require the systems to place a high level of trust in the 22
operations. The trustworthiness level should be measured from reliability, safety, security and usability. The system models and abstractions should incorporate fault models and recovery policies that reflect the scale, lifetime, control and reparability of components. Ganti et al. propose a CPS application of SenseWorld in [13] . It is used to facilitate connecting sensors, people and software objects to build community-centric sensing applications. The authors point out that the first and foremost challenge is to infer higher level information from the low level raw sensory data. In order to obtain meaningful information, it is important to draw high level inferences from the raw data. They use a frequent itemset mining algorithm to collect the high level inferences and get a general picture.
Johnson et al. provide several directions to handle the failures in CPS [19] . They classify the failures (i.e., untrustworthy data) into three categories: (1) the cyber side failures, like software bugs, system crashes, etc; (2) the physical side problems, such as sensor failures and irrelevant object influences; (3) the communication side issues, including message drops, omissions, man-in-the-middle attack and so on. The authors suggest that the degradation of the system state could potentially be used to detect faults.
Makedon et al. design an event driven framework for assistant CPS environments [25] . The event is modeled as the abnormal behavior of the system, such as the accidents or acute needs. Those behaviors are organized in a hierarchical tree. Two step event identification first assimilates different types of data and then identifies the event of interest. A low level security standard is applied to the raw data and a high level security strategy is used to check the generalized events.
The research of CPS is still at the beginning stage. Many papers have pointed out the importance of data trustworthiness, but detailed solutions are seldom provided. As mentioned in [19] , the complexity of this problem is the main challenge. Some studies use the strategies of abstraction and generalization to reduce the influences of noise and false alarms [13, 25] , or to detect untrustworthy data by performance degradation of the system [25] . However, they only propose such strategies as research directions and do not provide more technical details or concrete solutions. A dynamic, adaptive and highconfidence tool is in demand for the task of data trustworthiness analysis. To the best of our knowledge, Tru-Alarm is the first technique to analyze the data trustworthiness and detect true alarms for CPS.
Faulty Detection in Sensor Networks
With the advance in sensor network technology, the focus on data quality has also increased. Zhang et al. summarized the outlier detection techniques [38] and Gogoi et al. provide a survey of outlier detection methods in network anomaly identification [14] . In this subsection we examine several existing faulty sensor detection methods. According to the methodology, the works can be roughly classified into three categories: statistical model-based approaches, spatial-and-temporal similarity-based methods and feature retrieving techniques.
Statistical Model-based Approaches.
A large category of statistical models have been proposed and the faulty records are defined as those that do not follow the distribution of such models. Deshpande et al. use models of time-varying multivariate Gaussians to respond to predetermined queries [11] . 23 The tool responds to a predetermined set of query types, treating the sensor network like a database. Elnahrawy et al. utilize a Bayesian classifier (BC) to clean the data [12] . They model the sensor data as a standard normal distribution, and generate the prior knowledge of noise model from training data. Koushanfar et al. develop a cross validation method for Online False Alarm Detection (OFAD) based on multiple fault models [20] . Cuzzocrea et al. propose a robust sampling-based framework for privacy preserving OLAP [9] . They further propose the techniques to balance the accuracy and privacy of OLAP aggregations on data cubes [10] . The framework has many novel features ranging from nice theoretical properties to an effective and efficient protocol. It can be applied for constructing privacy preserving OLAP framework over distributed XML data [7, 8] .
To some extent, those methods can help user filter unreliable sensor data. However, most of them need training sets or prior knowledge to help construct the models and tune their parameters. Such aids may not be available to get in the CPS scenarios, since it is costly to manually label the large datasets. Moreover, in using different statistical models, it is hard for the user to determine which one is the most appropriate to the application. As pointed out in [11] , existing models are still not enough, more complex models should be used in many cases for faulty detection.
Spatial-and-temporal Similarity-based Methods.
This category of studies is based on the correlations among the data from neighboring sensors and their histories. Krishnamachari et al. exploit spatial and temporal relations of faulty sensor data [21] . Jeffery et al. attempt to take advantage of both spatial and temporal relations to correct faulty records [18] . Their method assumes that all data within each spatial and temporal granule are homogeneous. The fault recognition program assumes any value exceeding a high value threshold is faulty. Subramaniam et al. propose the Non-Parametric Outlier Detection (NPOD) model for sensor data [32] . This framework detects the outliers in a distributed manner by checking each sensor's k nearest neighbors. The data distributions are estimated by a kernel density function and multi-dimensional outliers are discovered by monitoring heterogeneous readings. Hsiao et al. provide a sensor rank based outlier detection method [15] . The system generates clusters of sensor readings and detects the outliers by measuring a sensor reading's dissimilarity to its neighbors.
There are several limits in those techniques: (1) As stated in [32] , such techniques can be used to the tasks of detecting the faulty sensor and noise, or discovering the intrusion events and meaningful abnormal behaviors. However in most time they are used simultaneously for both tasks. The faulty records and meaningful outliers are mixed together and cannot be distinguished. Therefore, it is hard to use them to determine the trustworthiness of alarms and sensors in CPS; (2) The nearest neighborhood similarity hypothesis may not work in several cases. The correlation of sensors are actually influenced by the deployment of individual sensors and the surrounding environment.
Feature Retrieving Techniques.
Feature retrieving techniques detect faulty data by comparing distinguishing features. Such methods first exploit several data features like environmental type, connecting degree and temporal patterns, and then construct classifiers to distinguish different types of faults. Ni et al. develop some common features, including a system feature, an environment feature and a data feature [27] . They combine different features to define and 24 detect commonly observed faults. Ramanathan et al. deploy sensors in Bangladesh to detect the presence of arsenic in groundwater [29] . A Fault Remediation System (FRS) is developed for determining faults and suggesting solutions using rule-based methods and static thresholds on the water pressure and other domain specific features. Tang et al. propose a Pattern Growth Graph (PGG) based method to detect variations and filter noise over evolving medical streams [33] . The feature of wave-pattern is proposed to capture the major information of medical data evolution and represent them compactly. The variations are detected by a wave-pattern matching algorithm and meaningful data changes are distinguished from noise. Yu et al. propose a two-stage approach to find anomalies in complicated datasets [37] . The algorithm employs an efficient deterministic space partition to eliminate obvious normal instances and generates a small set of anomaly candidates, and then checks each candidate with density based multiple criteria to determine the final results.
The feature based approaches usually have better performances than the previous two categories, but they are also more domain specific. Such methods require users to provide detailed context information and define the faulty records carefully. Scalability and adaptiveness are the major problem that prevent their use in a wider range of applications. Thus it is not practical to employ them in large scale CPS applications. Figure 22 summarizes the differences among Tru-Alarm and other faulty detection methods. Comparing to the related studies, Tru-Alarm does not need any training sets or prior defined knowledge, and it has the ability to distinguish meaningful alarms from faulty outliers and noise. As far as we know, Tru-Alarm is also the first algorithm to study the trustworthiness of the models of sensor, alarm and object simultaneously. 
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper studies the problem of trustworthiness analysis in cyber-physical systems. We propose trust models of sensor reliability, alarm and object trustworthiness.
In the Tru-Alarm framework, the system constructs an object-alarm graph and carries out trustworthiness inference along the links of that graph. Object pruning and sensor pruning techniques are proposed to accelerate the algorithm. Extensive experiments are conducted to show the scalability and applicability of the proposed methods.
There are many promising directions that can be explored in the future. For example, the system can incorporate expert knowledge and user-specified constraints for trustworthiness analysis, and predict the object's movement speed and directions based on the alarm sequences.
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